A new joint best relay and jammer selection (JBRJS) scheme is conceived for enhancing the physical layer security (PLS) of cooperative networks relying on multiple energy harvesting (EH) aided intermediate nodes, which accumulate energy based on the power splitting (PS) protocol. Specifically, we select the best intermediate node as the relay, whilst exploiting all the remaining nodes as friendly jammers. Furthermore, we investigate the joint optimization of the PS ratio and the relay-aided beamforming for maximizing the system's secrecy rate and present a full channel state information (CSI) based joint PS and beamforming (f JPSB) scheme as the optimal solution by converting the optimization problem formulated into a singlevariable optimization problem. We also propose a partial-CSI based JPSB (pJPSB) method for the scenario where only the main link's CSI is available. Our numerical results show that the proposed JBRJS scheme beneficially enhances the PLS compared to the joint random relay and jammer selection (JRRJS) and to the pure best relay selection (PBRS) schemes. Moreover, the secrecy rate of the proposed f JPSB and pJPSB schemes is obviously higher than that of the fixed PS and beamforming (FPSB) method, and it further increases with the number of the relay's transmit antennas.
I. INTRODUCTION
T ETHERLESS communication has become the norm.
To expand the coverage of wireless networks, node cooperation is widely used. However, due to the broadcast nature of wireless links, the signal transmitted from the source to the legitimate receiver is prone to malicious eavesdropping. Physical layer security (PLS), which exploits the unique characteristics of wireless channels to guarantee confidential signal transfer, has been extensively explored [1] , [2] . There are two main techniques of improving the PLS of node cooperation networks, namely relaying and jamming, respectively. Specifically, the relaying scheme aims for enhancing the signal received at the destination [3] - [9] , while the jamming scheme imposes the artificial noise on the eavesdropper [10] - [17] .
Hence, sophisticated joint cooperative relaying and jamming methods have been proposed for further improving the PLS of wireless transmissions. In [18] , an intermediate node was selected as the relay for delivering the source signal, and a pair of other intermediate nodes were exploited as friendly jammers for degrading the eavesdropper's reception. In [19] , Wang et al. adopted a joint relay and jammer selection (JRJS) method for enhancing the PLS of amplify-and-forward (AF) networks and quantified its advantage over the best stand-alone relay selection scheme dispensing with jamming in terms of its secrecy throughput. In [20] , Hui et al. proposed to group the intermediate nodes into relay sets as well as jammer sets, and investigated the relay/jammer selection problem by minimizing the secrecy outage probability (SOP). In [21] , a relay and jammer selection policy was proposed for maximizing the relay activation ratio and minimizing the jammer activation ratio. In [22] , a compressive survey of recent cooperative relaying and jamming techniques was presented. In [23] , Nakai et al. proposed to select relay sets based on buffer states and introduced cooperative jamming into the proposed buffer-state-based relay system. In our earlier work [24] , we proposed to select the single best relay and multiple 0090-6778 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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jammers for improving the PLS of cooperative relay networks, and focused on the joint optimization of relay selection and power allocation for maximizing the secrecy rate. This work was later extended to a more general cooperative network, where multiple relays and jammers are exploited [25] . Another challenge in cooperative networks is minimizing the energy consumption of wireless nodes. In many wireless cooperative networks, the nodes are generally energyconstrained and have no connections to power lines due to mobility or other constraints. Moreover, in many application scenarios, it is not convenient to replace the embedded battery of wireless nodes. As a result, the lifetime of the cooperative network is strictly limited by the energy budget of the nodes. Energy harvesting (EH), gleaning energy from radio-frequency (RF) signals, provides an attractive technique of recharging the nodes' batteries [26] , [27] . Compared to traditional solar, wind and thermal energy scavenging, RF-based EH is affected by the environment to a lesser extent and thus it is more stable. For making the application of far-field wireless power transfer promising, efficient rectenna design, waveform design, beamforming and power allocation have been studied to increase the end-to-end power transfer efficiency [28] , [29] . At the time of writing, there are two general EH protocols, namely time switching (TS) and power splitting (PS) [26] , [30] , respectively. The TS receivers switch between information processing and EH, while the PS receivers split the received signal energy into two parts for simultaneous signal processing and EH.
Recently, to improve security and to exploit EH for efficient energy transfer, numerous ideas have been presented on the relaying/jamming schemes, EH protocols, resource allocation and on the secrecy performance analysis of wirelessly-powered cooperative networks [31] - [39] . In [31] , [32] , the authors proposed to use a wireless EH-aided relay based on the TS protocol for enhancing the information security, and optimized the resource allocation for maximizing the secrecy rate. In [33] , the authors proposed an accumulate-and-jam protocol in which a friendly but energy-constrained jammer uses the energy harvested from the received RF signal to transmit artificial noise for securing the transmission. In [34] - [36] , the artificial noise was exploited for drowning the eavesdroppers, whilst simultaneously powering the relays. In [37] , the authors used multiple harvest-and-jam helpers for securing the AF relaying network and jointly optimized the artificial noise covariance matrix and the AF beamforming matrix. In [38] , [39] , an EH relay and an EH jammer were relied upon for securing the source-destination transmission. Specifically, in [38] , the secrecy performance was analyzed for four different relay selection schemes, while in [39] the optimal TS ratio was derived for maximizing the secrecy rate.
Against this backdrop, we investigate the security of a cooperative wireless network, where the source transmits confidential information to the destination aided by multiple energy-constrained intermediate nodes in the presence of an eavesdropper. The intermediate nodes are EH-enabled and harvest energy from the RF signals transmitted by the source based on the PS protocol. In contrast to [38] , [39] and our previous work [24] , [25] , the relay and jammers are equipped with multiple antennas chosen for beamforming. To benefit from both relaying and jamming, we propose a new joint best relay and jammer selection (JBRJS) scheme for improving the security, and then maximize the secrecy rate by the joint optimization of the PS ratio and the relay's beamformer. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1) We conceive a new JBRJS scheme for cooperative networks relying on multiple EH aided intermediate nodes for securing the source-destination (SD) link. Specifically, we select the specific intermediate node, which receives the highest power as the relay for forwarding the source message, whilst harnessing the remaining nodes as the friendly jammers to drown out the eavesdroppers. Both the relay and the jammers first harvest energy from the RF signal transmitted by the source and then transmit both the source signal and jamming signals relying on the accumulated energy using beamforming. This is in contrast to [37] where only the jammers are EH-aided and the relay has a constant power supply. It is noted that the relay only uses a specific portion of the harvested energy based on the PS protocol for its transmission, while the jammers use all the harvested energy to send artificial noise. This scenario is different from our previous work [24] where each intermediate node is equipped with a single antenna and is not EHenabled. Furthermore, the relay selection scheme in [24] is also different. 2) We investigate the joint optimization of the PS ratio and the relay-based beamforming for the sake of maximizing the secrecy rate as well as propose a full-CSI based joint PS and beamforming (f JPSB) method as the optimal solution under the idealized simplifying assumption that the channel state information (CSI) of both the main and wiretap links is perfectly known. 1 Specifically, we convert the joint optimization problem formulated into a single-variable optimization problem, which is the algebraic expression of the PS ratio by exploiting the relationship between the optimal beamforming vector and the PS ratio. 3) Upon considering the scenario in which only the main link's CSI is known, we present a partial-CSI based JPSB (pJPSB) method for maximizing the attainable rate of the main link and derive the optimal closed-form solution. The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section II, the system model is introduced and our secrecy rate analysis is presented. Section III investigates the joint optimization of the PS ratio as well as of the relay beamforming, and presents both our f JPSB and pJPSB methods, respectively. Our simulation results are provided in Section IV, while Section V concludes the paper. 1 In the scenario where a legal user in the wireless network is captured by Trojan and slaved as an eavesdropper to tap the signal transmission, the instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropping link may be available. For another example, in a scenario where a single active eavesdropper is registered in the wireless network as a subscribed user and exchanges signaling messages with the source and intermediate nodes, the global instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper may be known. Notation: Bold letters are used for the vectors or matrices; (·) T represents the transpose and (·) * represents the conjugate vector; (·) H denotes the conjugate transpose; · is the l 2 norm of a vector; [·] + is defined as max {·, 0}; λ max (·) denotes the largest eigenvalue of a matrix and v max (·) denotes the eigenvector associated with λ max (·); λ gen (·) defines an eigenvalue of a matrix and u gen (·) denotes an eigenvector of a matrix; I represents the identity matrix.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
Let us consider a wireless network consisting of a source S, a legitimate destination D, an eavesdropper E and K EH-enabled intermediate nodes. The intermediate nodes are energy-constrained and are capable of harvesting energy from the RF signals transmitted by the source. In the network, S, D and E are single-antenna nodes while all the intermediate nodes are equipped with multiple antennas. We propose to select the best intermediate node as the relay R for forwarding the source signal, whilst harnessing the remaining intermediate nodes as the jammers J 1 , J 2 , . . . , J K−1 to impose AN for drowning the eavesdropper, as shown in Fig.1 . We assume that the relay applies the decode-and-forward (DF) protocol. It is assumed that there is no direct link from S to D due to the long distance, while there is a direct link between S and E since E can be intentionally closer to S for tapping the transmission.
In the first transmission phase, S transmits a signal s, which has unity normalized power, given the power P s and the rate R d . The signal received by the kth intermediate node (k = 1, 2, . . . , K) can be expressed as
where ka , n 2 ka , . . . , n M k ka ] T is a (M k × 1)-element vector composed of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) received by each RA, and finally, n m ka ∈ CN (0, δ 2 n ) denotes the AWGN received at the mth RA of the kth intermediate node. For notational convenience, we use n ka ∈ CN(0, δ 2 n ) uniformly for n m ka ∈ CN (0, δ 2 n ). The relay uses the maximal ratio combining (MRC) method of [40] to perform BF for receiving the source signal, that is,
Then, the received signal y k becomes
The signal received at E is given by
where h se is the fading coefficient of the S to E channel, and n (1) e ∈ CN (0, δ 2 n ) represents the AWGN received at E. We select the specific intermediate node as the relay which receives the highest power. This implies that the relay is most likely to successfully decode the source signal. The best relay selection criterion can be obtained from (2) as
The remaining intermediate nodes are exploited as the jammers to send artificial noise. The received signal of R is split into two parts based on the PS protocol: a fraction ρ is used for EH and (1 − ρ) is used for signal processing, yielding
and
where h sR denotes the channel between S and R, ρ is the PS ratio, and n Rc ∈ CN(0, ζδ 2 n ) is the AWGN incurred by the conversion of the RF signal to the baseband signal. Then, the energy harvested from y R,h is given by
where η ∈ [0, 1] denotes the energy-conversion efficiency and T 2 is the first half of the time block. Thus, the relay's transmit power is given by
For each jammer, the total received signal is used for EH since no source decoding is needed. Thus, the energy harvested at the ith jammer J i can be computed as
where h sJi denotes the fading coefficient between S and the ith jammer J i . Then, the transmit power of J i is given by
In the second transmission phase, R transmits the reencoded source signal by exploiting BF, and each jammer sends artificial noise to interfere with E. Let us denote the relay's transmit BF vector as w t
where M R and M Ji are the number of transmit antennas (TAs) used at R and J i , respectively. Then, the signal received at the destination D is obtained as
where
Jid ] T denote the channel spanning from R to D and the channel from J i to D, respectively. Furthermore, h m Rd is the channel coefficient between the mth TA of R and D, while h m Jid is that between the mth TA of J i and D, and z i denotes the artificial noise transmitted by J i . Similarly, the signal received by E is given by
Jie ] T denote the channel spanning from R to E and from J i to E, respectively, while h m Re is the coefficient between the mth TA of R and E, and h m Jie is the coefficient between the mth TA of J i and E. We design z i as a vector in the null-space of h Jid , that is, (z i ) T h Jid = 0. Thus, by substituting (8) into (11), we can express (11) as
Similarly, by combining (8), (10) and (12), we obtain (12) as
Upon defining
we can rewrite (14) as
From (3), (13) and (15), we can obtain the instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at D as
and the instantaneous SNR at E as
Then, the achievable rate at D and E is given by
respectively. Thus, combining (18) and (19), we can obtain the achievable secrecy rate as
III. JOINT OPTIMIZATION OF POWER SPLITTING AND BEAMFORMING
In this section, we jointly optimize the PS ratio ρ and the BF weight vector w t R to enhance the security of the proposed JBRJS scheme. We first propose the f JPSB method for the full-CSI case, where the CSI of both the main link and of the wiretap link is known. For instance, in a scenario where a legitimate user is captured by a Trojan and slaved as an eavesdropper, the CSI of the eavesdropper may be inferred. Then, upon considering the case where only the desired channel's CSI is known, we present the pJPSB method.
A. f JPSB
In this subsection, we aim for maximizing the secrecy rate C s by jointly optimizing ρ and w t R under the full CSI assumption. The optimization problem is formulated as
The constraint 1 2 log 2 (1 + (1−ρ)Ps hsR 2 (1−ρ)δ 2 n +ζδ 2 n ) ≥ R d implies that the relay can successfully decode the source signal from y R,p .
Let us now introduce the notation of e = (z all ) H h all (16) and (17) into (21),
we can rewrite Problem (21) equivalently as
The optimal solution (w t R ) f JPSB opt of Problem (22) is given by
Correspondingly, when we have
achieves its largest value, which is given in (25) , at the top of this page.
Then, Problem (22) is transformed to Problem (26) which is stated at the top of this page. 
Upon defining
After a few further steps, we can derive the expression of x 2 as
The derivation details are in Appendix B. By substituting the expressions of x and y into y H x, we obtain y H x 2 which is given by (29) 
To simplify the expression, we define f 2 (ρ) = [θ + 2αξ1 e α+β + ξ1+ξ2 α+β (α + β + ξ 1 eρ)μ] 2 , f 3 (ρ) = f 2 (ρ) − 4 ξ1+ξ2 α+β αξ 1 c and f 4 (ρ) = ξ1+ξ2 2(α+β) μρ. By substituting (31), (32) and (33) into (27), we can express Problem (26) as
The details are given in Appendix C.
Since it is a challenge to obtain a closed-form solution of Problem (34), we apply the exhaustive search method to compute the solution ρ f JPSB opt . The exhaustive search method will be shown to be effective by our numerical results. Then, we can obtain the optimal BF weight vector w f JPSB 
B. pJPSB
In this subsection, we present the joint optimization of the PS ratio and the BF weight vector for the scenario, where the CSI of the wiretap channel is not available. Since only the CSI of the main link is known, we aim for maximizing the achievable rate at the destination D. The optimization problem is stated as
which can be equivalently rewritten as
The solution of Problem (36) can then be obtained as Observe from (23) 
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
This section presents the secrecy rate results for the proposed f JPSB and pJPSB schemes. The conventional fixed PS and beamforming (FPSB) method is used as the benchmark. We also compare the proposed JBRJS scheme both to the joint random relay and jammer selection (JRRJS) as well as to the pure best relay selection (PBRS) schemes in our EH-aided cooperative network. Moreover, we illustrate that the secrecy performance is improved, as the number of the antennas used at each intermediate node increases. In our numerical simulations, we use R d = 1 bit/s/Hz and δ 2 n = 0 dBm, while the step size σ of the exhaustive search method is set to 5 × 10 −7 .
In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 , we present the secrecy rate results of the proposed JBRJS scheme, in comparison to the JRRJS and the PBRS schemes. In the JRRJS scheme, one of the nodes is randomly selected as the relay for forwarding the source signal, while the others are used as the jammers to interfere with E. In the PBRS scheme, only the intermediate node satisfying the criterion (4) is selected as the relay for improving the security, but no jammers are activated. In Fig.2 and Fig.3 , we use a fixed PS ratio of ρ = 0.5 and a MRC based transmit BF vector, for the case of illustrating the advantage of the proposed JBRJS scheme in our EH-aided cooperative network. Fig. 2 shows the secrecy rate versus the transmit power P s of the proposed JBRJS scheme, of the JRRJS scheme, Fig.2 clearly show that the proposed JBRJS scheme has a higher secrecy rate than the JRRJS and PBRS schemes. From Fig. 2 , we can also observe that as P s increases, the secrecy rate of both the proposed JBRJS scheme and of the JRRJS scheme improve. This is because upon increasing P s , the power of the artificial noise received at E increases. It can be seen from Fig. 2 that the secrecy rate of the PBRS scheme remains near constant when P s is increased, because upon increasing P s , the achievable rate improvement at E is similar to that at D without using jammers provided that P s is higher than a threshold. In Fig. 3 , we depict the secrecy rate versus the number of intermediate nodes K at P s = 15 dBm and M = 4 TAs used for BF at each intermediate node. Observe from Fig. 3 that the proposed JBRJS scheme outperforms both the JRRJS and PBRS schemes in terms of its secrecy rate. Fig. 3 also shows that as K increases, the secrecy rate of the proposed JBRJS scheme improves more substantially than that of both the JRRJS and PBRS schemes. This is because increasing K leads to an additional relay selection gain as well as to an artificial noise power boost, both of which benefit the secrecy performance. Fig.4 shows the secrecy rate versus P s for the proposed f JPSB scheme, for the pJPSB scheme advocated and for the FPSB scheme associated with K = 4 and M = 4. In the FPSB scheme, the PS ratio is set to ρ = 0.5 and the transmit BF w t R is set based on the MRC scheme. It is observed that the secrecy rate of the proposed f JPSB and pJPSB schemes is approximately 1∼3 bit/s/Hz and 0.3∼0.4 bit/s/Hz higher than that of the conventional FPSB scheme, respectively. In addition, the proposed f JPSB scheme achieves a much higher secrecy rate than the others, explicitly showing the advantage of using the joint optimization of PS and BF. Additionally, as shown in Fig.4 , the secrecy rate increases with P s .
In Fig. 5 , we show the secrecy rate comparison of the f JPSB, pJPSB and FPSB schemes for P s = 15 dBm and Fig. 5 that the proposed f JPSB and pJPSB schemes lead to approximately 2.3∼2.8 bit/s/Hz and 0.4∼0.5 bit/s/Hz higher secrecy rate than the traditional FPSB scheme. One can also see that the proposed f JPSB scheme achieves a much higher secrecy rate than the pJPSB scheme, indicating that the joint optimization of the PS ratio and the relay BF substantially improves the secrecy performance when the CSI of the eavesdropping link is taken into account. In addition, as shown in Fig. 5 , the secrecy rate of all the proposed f JPSB, pJPSB and traditional FPSB schemes increases with K on average. However indeed, the secrecy rate of the proposed f JPSB scheme does not increase as monotonically as that of the proposed pJPSB and of the traditional FPSB schemes. The secrecy rate fluctuation of the proposed f JPSB scheme is mainly due to the fact that the step size of σ = 5 × 10 −7 does not always lead to the optimal ρ f JPSB opt for each K. By considering the secrecy rate vs. the computational complexity tradeoff which is linearly increasing at the order of O(1/σ), we opt for σ = 5 × 10 −7 . 
following Equation (24) for comparison. Observe from Fig. 6 that our proposed f JPSB scheme using the exhaustive search method for computing the optimal PS ratio ρ f JPSB opt always performs much better than using ρ = ρ th , verifying the efficiency of the exhaustive search method. This also implies that the optimization of the PS ratio substantially improves the secrecy performance.
In Fig.7 , we show the secrecy rate versus the number of TAs M used at each intermediate node for the proposed f JPSB and pJPSB schemes at P s = 15 dBm and K = 4. It can be observed from Fig. 7 that upon increasing the number of TAs, the secrecy rate of both the proposed f JPSB and pJPSB schemes increases, showing that the secrecy performance can be further improved by using more TAs at each intermediate node.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the PLS of cooperative wireless networks assisted by multiple EH-aided intermediate nodes, which accumulate energy based on the PS protocol. We proposed a JBRJS scheme for enhancing the security in which the best relay is selected to forward the source signal, and all the remaining intermediate nodes are exploited as jammers to transmit artificial noise. Furthermore, we studied the joint optimization of the PS ratio and the relay BF for the sake of maximizing the secrecy rate and proposed the f JPSB scheme for the full-CSI scenario to find the optimal solution. We also conceived the pJPSB scheme for the case where only the main link's CSI is available. Our simulation results demonstrate that the proposed JBRJS scheme outperforms both the JRRJS scheme and the PBRS scheme in terms of its secrecy rate, while the proposed f JPSB and pJPSB methods lead to higher secrecy rate than the FPSB method. Moreover, our simulation results show that the secrecy rate increases with the number of TAs.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF EQUATION (27)
By exploiting that λ(AB) = λ(BA) where λ(AB) denotes the eigenvalues of the product of matrices A and B, we can obtain λ max [(I+ ξ1 α+β ρH Re ) −1 ( α α+β I+ ξ1+ξ2 α+β ρH Rd )] which is given by (A.1), at the top of the following page.
According to the Sherman-Morrison formula [41] , we have Then, we can readily show that
Thus, we have (A.5) 
Then, according to [42] , we arrive at Equation (27) .
APPENDIX B PROOF OF EQUATION (28)
Since ( where tr(A) denotes the trace of matrix A. Then, correspondingly, Λ As f 1 (ρ) = ρ α+β+ρξ1 e , we have ρ = (α + β + ρξ 1 e)f 1 (ρ). Then, (C.1) can be expressed equivalently as (C.2), at the top of this page. Thus, we arrive at Equation (C.3), stated at the top of this page. Upon defining f 2 (ρ) = [θ + 2αξ1 e α+β + ξ1+ξ2 α+β (α + β + ξ 1 eρ)μ] 2 , f 3 (ρ) = f 2 (ρ) − 4 ξ1+ξ2 α+β αξ 1 c and f 4 (ρ) = ξ1+ξ2 2(α+β) μρ, then we can express Problem (26) as Problem (34) .
